

Armas contra etnias:

Documentos filtrados revelan que diplomáticos de EEUU en Georgia trafican con material biológico para laboratorio del Pentágono



Dilyana Gaytandzhieva

Traducido por el equipo de SOTT.net en español.

El siguiente es otro informe de investigación explosivo de la periodista búlgara DilyanaGaytandzhieva, quien previamente informó sobre [los vuelos diplomáticos de EE.UU. \(y sus aliados\) que transportan armas a ISIS](#) y a las [instalaciones de armas biológicas de EE.UU. en todo el mundo](#). La entrevistamos [aquí](#).

Científicos del Pentágono han sido enviados a 25 países y se les ha otorgado inmunidad diplomática para investigar virus, bacterias y toxinas mortales en laboratorios de EE.UU. en el marco de un programa de 2.1 mil millones de dólares del Departamento de Defensa.


La Embajada de Estados Unidos en Tbilisi transporta sangre humana congelada y patógenos como carga diplomática para un programa militar secreto de Estados Unidos. Los documentos internos, que implican a diplomáticos estadounidenses en el transporte de patógenos y en la experimentación de los mismos bajo la cobertura diplomática, me fueron filtrados por personal interno georgiano. Según estos documentos, científicos del Pentágono han sido enviados a la República de Georgia y se les ha concedido inmunidad diplomática para investigar enfermedades mortales e insectos que pican en el Centro Lugar, el laboratorio biológico del Pentágono en la capital de Georgia, Tbilisi.

Esta instalación militar es sólo uno de los muchos [laboratorios biológicos del Pentágono en 25 países](#) alrededor del mundo. Están financiados por la Agencia de Reducción de Amenazas de la Defensa (DTRA por sus siglas en inglés) bajo un programa militar de [2.100 millones de dólares, el Programa de Participación Biológica Cooperativa \(CBEP\)](#), y están ubicados en países de la antigua Unión Soviética como Georgia y Ucrania, el Medio Oriente, el Sudeste Asiático y África.



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En lugar de invertir en la salud de sus propios ciudadanos, el gobierno de EE.UU. ha gastado 161 millones de dólares de los contribuyentes en el extranjero, en el Centro Lugar en Tbilisi para la investigación de enfermedades mortales e insectos que pican.



La instalación secreta está situada apenas a 17 km de la base aérea militar Vaziani de EE.UU. en la capital de Georgia, Tbilisi.

El laboratorio biológico del Pentágono está muy vigilado. Todos los transeúntes en un radio de 100 metros son filmados, aunque el laboratorio biológico militar se encuentra en una zona residencial.



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Me filman mientras hablo con residentes locales en la calle cerca del laboratorio biológico del Pentágono y quiero saber por qué me filman los guardias de seguridad.

Los guardias de seguridad me advierten que si no cumplo, muestro mi pasaporte y me voy de este lugar, seré arrestada. También ha sido rechazada mi solicitud oficial de acceso a las instalaciones del Centro Lugar y de entrevistas.



Experimentos secretos nocturnos

Sin embargo, vuelvo por la noche cuando el laboratorio parece estar todavía en funcionamiento. No importa cuán grande la distancia, el aire está cargado con el olor de los productos químicos. Este olor que viene del Centro Lugar por la noche se lo lleva el viento hacia la zona residencial. **Los residentes locales del barrio de Alexeevka, donde se encuentra el laboratorio, se quejan de que por la noche queman en secreto productos químicos peligrosos y vierten residuos peligrosos al río cercano a través de las tuberías del laboratorio.**





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Un automóvil diplomático con placas de la Embajada de EE.UU. puede verse en el estacionamiento del Centro Lugar en la noche cuando el laboratorio parece seguir trabajando.





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Unas horas después, el automóvil diplomático aún se encuentra en el estacionamiento del Centro Lugar. Hay un fuerte olor a químicos en el área.

Los lugareños se quejan de constantes dolores de cabeza, náuseas, presión arterial alta y mareos cuando los productos químicos se queman por la noche en el laboratorio, que está a sólo unos doscientos metros de sus casas.

"Hay humo negro, rojo y verde en la noche, o especialmente temprano en la mañana alrededor de las 3 o 4 a.m. Incluso las gallinas han muerto. Pusieron una gran tubería bajo tierra y la conectaron a los desagües. Este olor viene de allí. Huele a huevos podridos y a heno en descomposición. El olor es muy fuerte y se propaga en diferentes direcciones por el viento", dice EteriGogitidze, que vive en un bloque de apartamentos junto al laboratorio.



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"Tengo enfermedad de la tiroides. Hay familias de tres personas en el vecindario y todos ellos tienen enfermedad de la tiroides. Dicen que es debido al laboratorio", explica EteriGogitidze del vecindario Alexeevka, donde se encuentra el laboratorio.



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Albert Nurbekyan, que vive a unos 300 metros del laboratorio, señala las cuatro chimeneas del Centro Lugar que emiten humo por las noches.

"A veces el viento esparce un olor a huevos podridos. Una vez me desperté temprano en la mañana y noté que salía humo violeta del laboratorio. Por la noche dejan salir el humo para que la gente no vea. ¿Por qué por la noche, qué es lo que nos ocultan?", pregunta, y luego nos da otro dato preocupante: "Hay grandes tuberías de plástico azul a lo largo de esta calle (desde el laboratorio) y desde donde todo va al río, que está a 3-4 km de distancia. No sólo contaminan el aire, sino que también envenenan el agua".

Residentes: El gas venenoso mató a dos filipinos





Los vecinos recuerdan un trágico incidente que involucró a cuatro filipinos que trabajaban en el Centro Lugar. Dos de los extranjeros murieron a causa de una supuesta intoxicación por gas en su apartamento alquilado en el bloque 44 del asentamiento de Alexeevka.

"La primera vez que llamaron al servicio de emergencia nos dijeron que se habían intoxicado con pescado. **Pero la segunda vez, cuando llegó la ambulancia, les salía espuma de la boca. Estaban gritando: "¡Socorro, socorro!"** Cuando fallecieron, se los llevaron y lo encubrieron todo. Todo sucedió aquí", muestra Albert Nurbekyan el piso cerrado donde murieron los científicos extranjeros.

Otra testigo, Elvira Ratiani, que vivía al lado, vio a los extranjeros morir ante sus ojos. "Eran mis vecinos, vivíamos en el mismo piso, y una vez envenenados, nos pidieron que llamáramos al servicio de urgencias. Llamamos por teléfono y el servicio de emergencias los salvó. Dijeron que probablemente fue envenenamiento por pescado. La segunda vez, llamaron a la puerta y de nuevo pidieron ayuda. Había cuatro filipinos, dos de los cuales fueron salvados, pero los otros dos murieron", recuerda Elvira Ratiani, que vive en el fatal bloque 44 del asentamiento Alexeevka, justo al lado del laboratorio.

Documentos filtrados: Sangre humana y patógenos como cargamento para la Embajada de EE.UU.

Los documentos internos y la correspondencia entre el Ministerio de Salud de Georgia y la Embajada de los Estados Unidos en Tbilisi muestran los experimentos que se han llevado a cabo en el Centro Lugar. **Documentos filtrados revelan que la Embajada de Estados Unidos en Tbilisi transporta patógenos, así como sangre humana congelada, como carga diplomática.**



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La Embajada de EE.UU. en Tbilisi es la dirección a la que se envían los patógenos y muestras de sangre como cargamento diplomático. La oficina de prensa de la Embajada rechazó hacer comentarios.



Embassy of the United States of America

US Embassy Tbilisi
2017.05.09-02

To: Ministry of Health,
Labour and Social Affairs of Georgia

Please be advised that one of the US Embassy agencies intends to receive air shipment WAAB701216 of laboratory supplies.

Since the shipment includes perishable supplies which requires special storage conditions, we kindly request your assistance in expediting, registration formalities of the shipment at Tbilisi Regional Customs.

It is hereby confirmed that the above mentioned cargo is a diplomatic and based on the agreement between Georgian and US Governments on July 31, 1992, the shipment is free of customs fees and taxes.

Please see attached shipment documents.

Thank You for Your Cooperation

Prakash Dickey
General Services Officer

საქმიანობის სახელმწიფო რეგულირების სააგენტოს უფროსს

100415-10 05
2017.05.09

აშშ საელჩოს თბილისში ვაცნობები, რომ საელჩოს სახელზე თბილისის აეროპორტში შედღებულთ # WAAB701216 ჩამოვად საჰაერო ტვირთი რომელიც შეიცავს ლაბორატორიულ მასალებს.

მოგახსენებთ რომ ტვირთი განკუთვნილია აშშ-ის საელჩოს ერთერთი სააგენტოსთვის.

ვინაიდან ტვირთი სწრაფად ფუჭებადა და მოითხოვს შენახვის განსაკუთრებულ პირობებს, ვთხოვთ გავყვითით შეამდგომილია თბილისის რეგიონალურ საბაჟოსთან აღნიშნული ტვირთის გასაბაჟოებლად საბაჟო შედამდგელობისაგან შეტლებინდაგეარად მოკლე ვადებში.

ვთხოვთ ძილით თანდართულია ტვირთის შესაბამისი თანშეღები საბუთების ასლები.

მადლობას მოგახსენებთ თანაშრომლობისთვის.



სააგენტოს პოლიტი, ადმინისტრაცია და
სამართლო მსახური სამსახური
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES

Date: 5/3/2017

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
3156 Rampart Road
Fort Collins, CO 80526
970-221-6400

Ship to:

American Embassy Tbilisi
ATTN: Beth Skaggs, CDC office
11 George Balanchine Street
Tbilisi, Georgia 0131
995591093412

CDC Commercial Invoice

One fibreboard box containing the following material:

Lot#	Description and courier AWB#	Quantity
	Bartonella antigens	30 x 0.5ml
	Bartonella mouse immune serum	12 x 0.5ml
	UN 3373 (biological substance category B)	
	HC # 3002.90.5150	
	"Diplomatic Cargo"	
	Packaged on dry ice	
	12 x 13 x 14 approximate weight 28lbs	
	These Commodities, technology, or Software were exported from the United States in accordance with the Export Administration Regulations. Diversion contrary to United States law is prohibited.	

Country of Origin: USA
Country of Ultimate Destination: Georgia
Reason for Export: Medical Research Related Purposes/Educational Materials
Gift of the US Government -Value for Customs only \$10.00
(no SED required) NLR

I/we hereby certify the information of this invoice is true and correct and that the contents of this shipment are as stated above. I/we do hereby authorize the selected carrier to execute any additional documents necessary for the export of goods described herein on my/our behalf.

Typed Name of Sender: Stacey Bartlett	Title of Sender: Bio Sci Lab Tech
Signature:	Date:





DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES

Date: 5/3/2017

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3156 Rampart Road
Fort Collins, CO 80526
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Ship to:

American Embassy Tbilisi
ATTN: Beth Skaggs, CDC office
11 George Balanchine Street
Tbilisi, Georgia 0131
995591093412

CDC Invoice

One fibreboard box containing the following material:

Lot#	Description and courier AWB#	Quantity
	Bartonella clarridgeiae antigen	10 x 0.5ml
	Bartonella koehlerae antigen	10 x 0.5ml
	Bartonella Clarridgeiae mouse immune serum	4 x 0.5ml
	Bartonella Koehlerae mouse immune serum	4 x 0.5ml
	Bartonella henselae type 2 antigen	10 x 0.5ml
	Bartonella henselae type 2 mouse immune serum	4 x 0.5ml

"Diplomatic Cargo"

Country of Origin: USA
Country of Ultimate Destination: Georgia
Reason for Export: Medical Research Related Purposes/Educational Materials
Gift of the US Government -Value for Customs only \$10.00
(no SED required) NLR



GEIS-GTD STUDY SHIPMENT

DATE SENT: 03AUG2015

FROM: NHRC Enteric Disease Surveillance Program Laboratory

TO: US EMBASSY TBILISI/USAMRU-G
#11 GEORGE BALANCHINE STREET
ATTN: Brett Taylor
TBILISI 0131, GEORGIA
Phone: +995-557-38-1492

CONTENTS:

ITEM	DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY
1	Qiagen QuantiTect Multiplex PCR Kit (200-rxn)	1
2	Qiagen QuantiTect Multiplex PCR Kit (40-rxn)	3
3	Control strain for Shigella spp. & S/S/C assays (Shigella flexneri, invC+)	1
4	Control strain for Pathogenic E. coli assay [ATCC 43890 (EHEC, vt1+)]	1
5	Control strain for Pathogenic E. coli assay [ATCC 29552 (EAEC, pCVD+)]	1
6	Control gDNA for Pathogenic E. coli assay [ATCC 29552 (EAEC, pCVD+), 100 µL]	1
7	Pathogenic E. coli primer – EHECvt1-F (new)	1

საქართველოში ამერიკის შეერთებული
შტატების საელჩოს მომსახურების ოფიცერს,
ქალბატონ პრაკაპ დიკვის

მის: ქ.თბილისი,ჯორჯ ბალანჩინის ქ. N11

ქალბატონო პრაკაპ,

თქვენი წერილის № _____ მასუხად სადაც აღნიშნულია რომ
ამერიკის შეერთებული შტატების საელჩოსათვის განკუთვნილი ტვირთი შეიცავს
ადამიანის გაყინულ სისხლს თუმცა თქვენს მიერ მოწოდებულ ინვოისში
იხ თანდართული ინვოისი წარმოდგენილია პროდუქტი რომელიც ჩვენს მიერ
მომიებული ინფორმაციით გამოიყენება ჰეპატიტით დაავადებულ პაციენტების
მონიტორინგისათვის განკუთვნილ კვლევებში გაცნობებთ რომ საქართველოს
კანონის მუხლი ¹³ თანახმად აღნიშნული პროდუქტი საქართველოს ბაზარზე
დაშვების რეჟიმების გვერდის ავლით შეიძლება შემოტანილ იქნეს არაკომერციული
მიზნით, კლინიკამდელი და კლინიკური კვლევებისათვის.

პატივისცემით,

დეპარტამენტის უფროსის მოვალეობის შემსრულებელი თ.ჯიქია

ვიზა:
ნ. შენგელიძე

შემსრულებელი:
ქ.ჯანდიერი

Esta carta del Ministerio de Salud de Georgia a la Embajada de EE.UU. en Tbilisi exige de la obligación de registro a la importación, ya que los diplomáticos estadounidenses afirman que la sangre humana congelada es necesaria para fines de investigación en relación con un programa estadounidense de lucha contra la hepatitis C en Georgia.

Los envíos de carga diplomática están exentos de inspección e impuestos. De acuerdo con las [instrucciones de la Agencia de Reducción de Amenazas de Defensa del Pentágono \(DTRA\)](#), que supervisa y financia los laboratorios, el material biológico para las necesidades del programa debe ser enviado como artículos portados en mano a las embajadas de Estados Unidos.

SUBJECT: Export/Import Procedures for Hand-Carrying Items Overseas for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program

Background:

The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program personnel, contractors, and U.S. Government collaborators occasionally transport supplies and equipment on commercial airlines, via checked or hand-carried baggage, to nations receiving technical aid. Hand-carried items include, but are not limited to, biological materials, reagents, laboratory supplies, thermal cameras, Ruggedized Advanced Pathogen Identification Devices (R.A.P.I.D.), testing devices, and other technical assistance items.

While it is mandatory to use the Single Shipper as the conveyance to ship technical assistance items and obtain duty free clearance, it is recognized that for a variety of reasons conducting hand-carries of certain articles may be the most cost-effective expeditious method or approach to delivering time-sensitive items to CTR technical aid recipients. Since 2005, CTR personnel, contractors, and collaborators have hand-carried more than 600 items to the CTR recipient nations.

There are significant risks to the traveler, as well as the Program, associated with hand-carrying technical assistance items into partner nations. Transport and packaging of specific items, e.g., biological material, are regulated by national, regional, and global legislation. Many countries have established import and quarantine guidelines to protect their valuable agricultural products. Countries possessing biological materials have enacted strict regulations to reduce the possibility that these materials will fall into the wrong hands. Some countries require permits for specific types of organisms and materials (e.g., Kazakhstan requires a veterinary certificate of analysis for animal-derived products).

Purpose:

To establish a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for hand-carrying items procured with CTR funding to the host-nation recipients of technical assistance. The SOP will require individuals who hand-carry technical assistance items for the CTR Program to comply with all applicable export/import laws and regulations, both in the United States and the country of ultimate destination. This should be accomplished by following procedures established by CTR Program Integration (J3CTI) (including the Defense Threat Reduction Offices (DTROs) and the Regional Cooperative Engagement Offices (RCEOs)) and outlined herein. Specifically, this SOP:

1. Identifies J3CTI for the development, publication, and maintenance of this Hand-Carry SOP encompassing Continental United States (CONUS) and Outside Continental United States (OCONUS) requirements for timely, cost efficient, and export/import-compliant conveyance;
2. Assigns responsibility to CTR Program Integration, Initiatives, and Logistics Support Branch (J3CTII), for the development and maintenance of hand-carry *export* procedures that will allow travelers to comply with all applicable export laws and regulations leaving CONUS; and

J3CTIU DTRA EURASIA	COUNTR(IES)	PROCEDURES
DTRO-Kyiv	UKRAINE	<p>Established procedure:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Declare items "official goods" at the point of entry into country by filling out the customs declaration form. 2. A Ukraine Customs officer will review the declaration and decide whether to stamp it and clear you through, or to leave the declared item(s) at customs storage and initiate paperwork. 3. Leave the items with the customs post upon decision of the Customs officer. 4. Contact the sponsoring section (DTRO) and provide the paperwork generated by the customs officer. 5. The GSO/Customs & Shipping Office in the U.S. Embassy works with customs to clear the items. 6. Items delivered to the U.S. Embassy for collection by the traveler. <p>The entire process, including delivery to the U.S. Embassy, may take 2-3 days after the paperwork is received by the GSO/Customs & Shipping Office.</p>
	RUSSIA	<p>No established procedure. If possible, travelers should use the Single Shipper.</p> <p>Anyone making a hand-carry for DTRO purposes and according to some technical assistance bilateral agreement must coordinate with local authorities prior to arrival. The traveler should have proper documents in hand confirming that bringing the items into country is agreed and allowed.</p> <p>If the person making a hand-carry has diplomatic status, he/she can act as a diplomatic courier and carry the items in a diplomatic pouch. The items must be properly sealed and identified as diplomatic cargo. The traveler must have a courier letter from the State Department.</p>
DTRO-Tashkent	UZBEKISTAN	<p>Established procedure:</p> <p>If possible, travelers should use the Single Shipper. If time is of the essence, travelers should contact the POCs in the SOP and work through the shipping office in the U.S. Embassy.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Travelers submit a copy of Proforma Invoice identifying all items hand carried for import and requiring declaration to the DTRO office at least 30 days prior to arrival. 2. Travelers complete a customs declaration form provided either upon entry or in-flight prior to arrival. This is for basic items (not defined). 3. Complex items (not defined) hand-carried for import must be identified to the DTRO office at least 30 days prior to arrival for coordination with the appropriate agencies to obtain approval to import.
J3CTIU DTRA EURASIA	COUNTR(IES)	PROCEDURES
DTRO-Yerevan	ARMENIA	<p>Established procedure:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ensure items for hand-carry are not on Armenia's prohibited items list, which changes regularly. 2. Travelers submit the following to the DTRO office at least 12 days prior to

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En los casos de importación a Rusia, este material biológico debe ser transportado por diplomáticos en una valija diplomática y sellado como carga diplomática.

El Pentágono: Las prostitutas están estrictamente prohibidas, no hay sexo en el extranjero

Otras [instrucciones](#) para el personal estadounidense que trabaja bajo el programa militar prohíben el uso de prostitutas, y cualquier interacción con personas de las que se pueda suponer razonablemente que trabajan como prostitutas.

SEP 11 2011

CT SOP
June 2011
OPR: DTRA/OP-CTIO

SUBJECT: Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR), Travel Standards of Conduct

Reference: (a) *Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Standard Operating Procedure*, Travel Standards of Conduct, September 1, 2005
(b) *Defense Threat Reduction Agency On-Site Inspection (OS) Travel Standards of Conduct*, DTRA OS 5240.1, March 1, 2004

1. **PURPOSE.** This written guidance establishes policy, standards, and procedures for conduct while on travel status for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program.
2. **APPLICABILITY.** This written guidance applies to all CTR employees and to any other government employee on travel funded by the CTR Program or under CTR issued travel orders. This written guidance is applicable for the duration of an individual's travel status.
3. **POLICY.** The CTR Program has an important and visible mission under U.S. national security policy. To ensure the success and credibility of CTR in executing this mission, all personnel must exhibit the highest standards of character, integrity, and conduct at all times. As a team member traveling on a United States Government (USG) sponsored mission, you are a representative of the USG and as such are required to act accordingly. Failure to meet these standards impairs the CTR mission and reflects unfavorably on the USG.

The Team Leaders are responsible for establishing and enforcing the Standards of Conduct. Because you represent the CTR Program and the USG, you must observe these standards of conduct and the instruction of the Team Leader at all times when on travel, including working and non-working hours. This is a more restrictive standard than that applicable when not on travel status, reflecting the highly conspicuous nature of travel and the CTR mission. Failure to abide by these standards may result in disciplinary personnel action, such as restriction of travel privileges, suspension, or termination. The Team Leader also has authority to send a team member home for any violation or presumed violations of these Standards of Conduct.

Team Leaders are also responsible for ensuring groups adhere to Embassy specific guidelines, such as the Regional Security Officer briefings and communications requirements. Team Leads should discuss these with US Embassy representatives (DTRO Chiefs and/or Defense Attaché Office) and carefully review the Clearance Request Approval instructions before departure as the Embassy has authority to provide guidance on operating rules to traveling teams, and has authority to direct immediate departure of any USG employee or contractor. Whenever possible, Embassy representatives will discuss situations with Director, CTR and the Program Manager prior to taking action.

4.6. Personal Relationships.

4.6.1. Since CTR Program travelers are conspicuous, you must avoid any impression of impropriety. Romantic, intimate, or sexual relations with citizens or residents of CTR cooperative partner countries are strongly discouraged. Romantic, intimate, or sexual relations among team members also are strongly discouraged. Foreign security services are known to use the enticement of such relations to exploit foreign officials. As such, any relationship with foreign nationals or U.S. expatriates must be reported to DTRA/SC as soon as possible. If you have a Top Secret/SCI clearance, please contact DTRA/SC for further reporting requirements.

4.6.2. The following are prohibited:

- The use of prostitutes;
- Any interaction with individuals who may reasonably be assumed to be working as prostitutes

4.6.3. Notify the Team Leader and Program Manager of any violation of this standard as soon as possible. Team Leaders will inform DTRA/SC within one business day of return from travel.

4.7. Personal Belongings.

4.7.1. Avoid bringing unnecessary personal belongings when traveling. In particular, travelers are discouraged from bringing high value items or items that invite scrutiny from customs or border security personnel. Bring over the counter medications or those for which you have valid, personal prescriptions. For prescription medication, have the medication in the original container as provided by the pharmacy or doctor. Do not transport pornographic material.

4.8. Non-Work Activities.

4.8.1. Your focus while on travel status is the CTR mission. The Team Leader is responsible for planning travel to accomplish the mission in the minimum, reasonable period, for establishing non-working hours, and for establishing any restrictions on personal activity (beyond those in this guidance). Personal activities conducted outside working hours must not have an adverse effect on the mission, travel arrangements, or other team members. In addition, personal activities must not reflect negatively on the travel team, the CTR Program, or the USG.

5. ENFORCEMENT. Failure to abide by these standards of professional conduct could result in the compromise of DTRA-CTR missions and other related missions and


Las relaciones románticas, íntimas o sexuales con ciudadanos locales o entre miembros de un equipo se desalientan fuertemente ya que "se sabe que los servicios de seguridad extranjeros utilizan la tentación de tales relaciones para explotar a funcionarios extranjeros". Como tal, una relación con extranjeros debe ser reportada a la DTRA tan pronto como sea posible, dice el documento.

Científicos estadounidenses prueban virus bajo inmunidad diplomática

El programa del Centro Lugar está a cargo de biólogos de la Unidad de Investigación Médica del Ejército de los Estados Unidos-Georgia (USAMRU-G) junto con contratistas privados estadounidenses y el Centro para el Control de Enfermedades de los Estados Unidos (CDC). Ciertas zonas del laboratorio son zonas clasificadas y sólo son accesibles a ciudadanos estadounidenses con [autorización de seguridad](#). Se les concede inmunidad diplomática en virtud del Acuerdo de cooperación en materia de defensa entre los Estados Unidos y Georgia de 2002.

#	RFP Section	Question	Proposed Answer
	Section B		
36	J- Attachment 3 (DD254) Paragraph 13b	Security Clearances The DD254 implies that ALL personnel are to be U.S citizens and have appropriate security clearances. Will the Government confirm that this will apply only to certain key individuals on a Task Order by Task Order basis, considering the likely involvement of large numbers of non-U.S. nationals in the program?	The need to be a US citizen and have appropriate security clearance is based on the need of that individual to have access to classified information or enter classified spaces.

*DoD Requirements for contractors under the DTRA program in former Soviet Union countries such as Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
Source: fbo.gov*



El acuerdo entre EE.UU. y Georgia le otorga estatus diplomático al personal militar y civil (incluyendo vehículos diplomáticos) que trabaja en Georgia.

Joshua Bast es el subdirector de la Unidad de Investigación Médica del Ejército de los Estados Unidos-Georgia (USAMRU-G). El científico militar estadounidense conduce un coche diplomático y goza de inmunidad diplomática, sin ser diplomático.



Joshua Bast parte del Centro Lugar en un automóvil diplomático de la Embajada de EE.UU. en Tbilisi.

Ha sido enviado a Georgia desde 2015 por el Instituto de Investigación del Ejército del Pentágono Walter Reed. Su unidad militar también opera un laboratorio separado dentro del Centro Lugar, el laboratorio de investigación del Instituto Walter Reed del Ejército. Sin embargo, cuando lo confronté a la entrada del laboratorio, negó rotundamente que trabajara en el Centro Lugar.



"No trabajo aquí".



"Usted trabaja aquí porque he visto este auto el otro día y usted está aquí otra vez".



- "¿Es usted de la Embajada de EE.UU.?" -

-Sí.-



"¿Qué está haciendo aquí en el Centro Lugar? ¿Es usted un científico?"



Sin embargo, los correos electrónicos filtrados entre el Pentágono y el Ministerio de Salud de Georgia (a continuación) lo contradicen. Joshua Bast trabaja en el Centro Lugar.

From: Gagnidze, Archil CTR USARMY MEDCOM WRAIR (GG)
<archil.gagnidze.ctr@mail.mil>
Sent: Monday, February 26, 2018 2:03 PM
To: Sopo Belkania
Cc: James, Norland V MAJ USARMY MEDCOM USAMRU-G (US); Mariana Mkurnali
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] RE: Request for a meeting with Minister of Health of Georgia (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE

მოგესალმებით ქალბატონო სოფიკო,

დამსწრე პირების იქნებიან:

- 1) Barbara R. Holcomb - MPMC Commanding General
- 2) David Rogers - MPMC Command Sergeant Major
- 3) Timothy Sprunger - MPMC Command Sergeant Major
- 4) Paul Kwon - Director - USAMRD-G
- 5) Joshua Bast - Deputy Director - USAMRD-G
- 6) Archil Gagnidze - Business Manager - USAMRD-G
- 7) Tamar Akhvediani - Clinical Researcher - USAMRD-G

ასევე შემოგვიერთდება ბატონი ამირან გამყრელიძე.

დიდი მადლობა,

პატივისცემით,

V/R,

Archil Gagnidze

Business Manager
Contractor, TMC Global Professional Services U.S. Army Medical Research Directorate - Georgia (USAMRD-G)
16 Kakheti Highway, Tbilisi 0190, Georgia

Office: +995 32 2 24 34 11 (ext. 2040)
Mobile: +995 557 17 11 17
E-mail: archil.gagnidze.ctr@mail.mil

-----Original Message-----

From: Sopo Belkania [mailto:sbelkania@moh.gov.ge]
Sent: Thursday, February 22, 2018 6:24 PM
To: Gagnidze, Archil CTR USARMY MEDCOM WRAIR (GG)
Cc: James, Norland V MAJ USARMY MEDCOM USAMRU-G (US); Mariana Mkurnali

Archil Gagnidze

Business Manager

Contractor, TMC Global Professional Services U.S. Army Medical Research Directorate - Georgia (USAMRD-G)
16 Kakheti Highway, Tbilisi 0190, Georgia

Office: +995 32 2 24 34 11 (ext. 2040)

Mobile: +995 557 17 11 17

E-mail: archil.gagnidze.ctr@mail.mil

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: NONE

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: NONE

3

Joshua Bast es el subdirector de USAMRU-Georgia, según la correspondencia filtrada entre la unidad de investigación médica del Pentágono en Georgia y el Ministerio de Salud de Georgia. La dirección de USAMRU-Georgia indicada en ese correo electrónico oficial (anteriormente) es la dirección del Centro Lugar (16 Autopista Kakheti, Tbilisi).

¿Por qué miente un empleado del Pentágono sobre su lugar de trabajo? No he recibido ninguna respuesta. Joshua Bast se fue inmediatamente después de ser confrontado. No es el único estadounidense que trabaja en el programa del Pentágono al que se le ha concedido inmunidad diplomática sin ser diplomático. Hay seis coches diplomáticos en el aparcamiento del laboratorio, todos ellos con placas de matrícula de la Embajada de los Estados Unidos.





© Al Mayadeen TV

Seis vehículos diplomáticos de la Embajada de EE.UU. estacionados en el Centro Lugar.





© Asyalvanova


El guardia de seguridad del Centro Lugar me ordena que me quede donde estoy, pero huyo corriendo.

Después de rehusarme a obedecer, el guardia de seguridad sube a un auto sin marcas, pero logro escapar.



© Asyalvanova

Guardias de seguridad patrullan el área alrededor del laboratorio mientras que me escondo en un puente cercano.



Estos guardias de seguridad que patrullan el área alrededor del laboratorio en un coche sin marcas [reciben su salario del Pentágono](#) y no del gobierno de Georgia, según la información obtenida del registro de contratos federales de Estados Unidos. Por lo tanto, Georgia no tiene control sobre las actividades de su patrocinador extranjero. Además, los científicos del Pentágono pueden trabajar en violación directa del derecho internacional.

La ley internacional no se aplica

En virtud de un acuerdo de tres años de duración entre el Instituto del Ejército Walter Reed y el Centro Nacional Georgiano para el Control de Enfermedades (NCDC), el Pentágono ha tenido pleno acceso a la colección local de agentes biológicos mortales para estudiarlos. Estos son agentes que pueden causar ántrax, tularemia, brucelosis y peste.

10.01 Termination by Unilateral Action. Either Party may unilaterally terminate this entire Agreement at any time by giving the other party written notice, not less than 30 days prior to the desired termination date.

10.02 Termination Procedures. In the event of termination, the Parties shall specify the disposition of all property, patents and other results of work accomplished or in progress, arising from or performed under this Agreement by written notice. Upon receipt of a written termination notice, the Parties shall not make any new commitments and shall, to the extent feasible, cancel all outstanding commitments that relate to this Agreement. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, any exclusive license entered into by the Parties relating to this Agreement shall be simultaneously terminated unless the Parties agree to retain such exclusive license.

Article 11. Disputes

11.00 Settlement. Any dispute arising under this Agreement which is not disposed of by agreement of the principal investigators shall be submitted jointly to the signatories of this Agreement. A joint decision of the signatories or their designees shall be the disposition of such dispute. If the Parties cannot reach a joint decision, any Party may terminate this Agreement immediately. To be clear, termination of this agreement is the only remedy or recourse available to any Party in the event of an irresolvable dispute. The Parties agree that no court, tribunal, or similar judicial or administrative body of the countries of any Party or of any international entity or country has jurisdiction or authority to consider, or rule on, or provide an enforceable judgment concerning disputes arising between the Parties under this Agreement.

Article 12. Liability

12.00 Property. Neither Party shall be responsible for damages to any property provided to, or acquired by, the other Party pursuant to this Agreement.

12.01 No Warranty. The Parties make no express or implied warranty as to any matter whatsoever, including the conditions of the research or any invention or product, whether tangible or intangible, made, or developed under this agreement, or the ownership, merchantability, or fitness for a particular purpose of the research or any invention or product. The Parties further make no warranty that the use of any invention or other intellectual property or product contributed, made or developed under this agreement will not infringe any other United States or foreign patent or other intellectual property right. In no event will any Party be liable to any other Party for compensatory, punitive, exemplary or consequential damages.

Article 13. Miscellaneous

13.00 International Law not applicable. The Parties recognize and agree that THIS IS NOT AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, that international law is not applicable to this

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Según las provisiones del acuerdo, "la ley internacional no se aplica en este acuerdo, las partes coinciden en que ninguna corte, tribunal o entidad internacional tiene jurisdicción ni autoridad para considerar o proveer juicio en caso de las disputas que surjan entre las partes del acuerdo".

Drones para esparcir mosquitos tóxicos

El trabajo que realizan los diplomáticos estadounidenses en el Centro Lugar no tiene nada que ver con la diplomacia y no entra dentro de la Convención de Viena sobre Relaciones Diplomáticas. Joshua Best, por ejemplo, es entomólogo e investiga insectos, según un video publicado por la Embajada de Estados Unidos para promover los fines pacíficos del programa militar de Estados Unidos en Georgia.




Captura de un video que promociona las intenciones pacíficas del programa del Pentágono.

Joshua Best se presenta como entomólogo.

¿Por qué un entomólogo trabaja para el ejército de los Estados Unidos y por qué se le concede inmunidad diplomática? La guerra entomológica es un tipo de guerra biológica que utiliza insectos para transmitir enfermedades. Georgia comparte fronteras con el principal rival de Estados Unidos, Rusia. Moscú ha expresado repetidamente su preocupación por el posible desarrollo de armas biológicas cerca de las fronteras rusas, incluida la propagación de enfermedades a través de los insectos.

Tales temores no son infundados, considerando una reciente patente estadounidense para un [Sistema de Esparcimiento Aérea de Mosquitos Tóxicos](#), otorgada por la Oficina de Patentes y Marcas de los Estados Unidos en 2014. La invención incluye un dron [avión no tripulado-NdT] que puede liberar mosquitos infectados.



US008967029B1

(12) **United States Patent**
Calvert

(10) **Patent No.:** **US 8,967,029 B1**
(45) **Date of Patent:** **Mar. 3, 2015**

(54) **TOXIC MOSQUITO AERIAL RELEASE SYSTEM**

2201/02096; B64C 2201/024; B64C 2201/128;
B64C 2201/146; B64C 39/024; A01K 5/00;
A01K 67/033

(71) Applicant: **TMARS Associates, Trustee for Toxic mosquito aerial release system CRT Trust, Manassas, VA (US)**

USPC 89/1.11, 1.1; 244/136; 119/650, 651;
239/8, 171, 172

(72) Inventor: **S. Mill Calvert, Manassas, VA (US)**

(56) **References Cited**

(73) Assignee: **TMARS Associates, Trustee for Toxic mosquito aerial release system CRT Trust, Manassas, VA (US)**

U.S. PATENT DOCUMENTS

(*) Notice: Subject to any disclaimer, the term of this patent is extended or adjusted under 35 U.S.C. 154(b) by 0 days.

2,098,887	A *	11/1937	Saiterlee	244/136
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2014/0246545	A1 *	9/2014	Markov	244/190

(21) Appl. No.: **14/549,305**

(22) Filed: **Nov. 20, 2014**

* cited by examiner

(51) **Int. Cl.**
B64D 1/18 (2006.01)
F41H 13/00 (2006.01)
B64D 1/02 (2006.01)
A01K 67/033 (2006.01)
A01K 5/00 (2006.01)
B64C 39/02 (2006.01)

Primary Examiner **Bret Hayes**
(74) *Attorney, Agent, or Firm* **Louis Ventre, Jr.**


(52) **U.S. Cl.**
CPC **F41H 13/00** (2013.01); **B64D 1/02** (2013.01);
A01K 67/033 (2013.01); **A01K 5/00** (2013.01);
B64C 39/024 (2013.01); **B64C 2201/024**
(2013.01); **B64C 2201/128** (2013.01); **B64C**
2201/146 (2013.01)

(57) **ABSTRACT**

A device for the aerial release of mosquitoes includes an unmanned aerial vehicle operable by remote control. It carries a container holding a central processing unit and a mosquito breeding bin, which is a self-contained volume housing mosquitoes and a mosquito food having a toxin suitable to be transmitted by mosquito bite after the mosquito consumes the mosquito food. A release tube is connected to the mosquito breeding bin and sized to release mosquitoes from the mosquito breeding bin. A valve is connected to the release tube and is operable by remote control so that when opened, the mosquitoes have an open pathway out of the container through the release tube.

(58) **Field of Classification Search**
CPC I41H 13/00; I42B 12/56; I834D 1/02;
B34D 1/08; B34D 1/10; B34D 1/12; G05D

3 Claims, 1 Drawing Sheet



US 8,967,029 B1

1
TOXIC MOSQUITO AERIAL RELEASE SYSTEM

TECHNICAL FIELD

In the field of aeronautics, disclosed is an aircraft having structure enabling aerial breeding and discharge of mosquitoes.

BACKGROUND ART

Governments have sought after weapons that can be used to deliver chemicals, viral and bacteriological substances for lethal and non-lethal administration to assembled masses of people. Non-lethal uses typically include peacekeeping operations, for use in actions not considered "military operations," and against terrorists or state actors in war. In this sense, such weapons can be used to control both armed enemies and civilians. Not all uses of such weapons are prohibited by treaty. The present invention is capable of delivering lethal and non-lethal toxins, including any agent that can be carried and administered by a mosquito.

In the United States, lethal chemical weapons are regulated by the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, which entered into force in 1997. This treaty is usually referred to as the Chemical Weapons Convention. It is an arms control treaty with 165 signatory countries and it outlaws the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and their precursors. The treaty has been interpreted to allow the development of non-lethal chemicals, such as calumative and gastrointestinal convulsives, when classified as riot control agents. Additionally, non-lethal weapons involving calumative agents have been studied for use by the U.S. armed forces.

In the United States, lethal biological weapons are regulated by the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (usually referred to as the Biological Weapons Convention). This is a 1972 treaty banning the production of microbial and other biological agents or toxins and their means of delivery. This treaty has been interpreted not to apply to the biological agents or toxins themselves, but rather certain purposes for which they may be employed which are prohibited. Thus, there are permitted purposes defined to include prophylactic, protective and other peaceful purposes. The biological agents or toxins may not be retained in quantities that have no justification or which are inconsistent with the permitted purposes.

In times of armed conflict and the pursuit of destroying an enemy, living organisms and infected materials derived from them have been used by state and non-state actors. For example, in 300 BC, the Greeks polluted the wells and drinking water supplies of their enemies with animal corpses. Other examples abound in history: in 184 BC, Hannibal's army sent snakes to the enemy led by King Eumenes of Pergamum and achieved a victory; in 1346, the Tartars catapulted bodies infected with plague into what is now the Ukraine; in the 1500's, Spanish conquistadors killed off the inhabitants of Central and South America with small pox and measles; in the 1700's British forces used blankets contaminated with small pox to infect North American Indians; in the early 1940's the Japanese armed forces dropped bombs containing up to 15 million plague infected fleas on the Chinese cities of Qiongzou and Ning-hsien; in the 1990's, Aum Shiin-kyo in Japan attempted terrorism at least 10 times to use

2

anthrax, botulinum toxin, Q fever agent and Ebola virus in aerosol form; in 1995, Iraq confirmed that it had produced and deployed bombs, rockets and aircraft spray tanks containing *Bacillus anthracis* and botulinum toxin.

Well known methods of a toxin delivery include dispersion effected by using an aerosol spray, explosive, and direct food or water contamination. Aerosol sprays were thought to be the most effective means of widespread dissemination because an infectious material could travel tens of miles in an inhalable particle size. However factors like particle size of the agent, stability of the agent under desiccating conditions and ultraviolet light, wind speed, wind direction, and atmospheric stability are known to alter the effectiveness of a delivery system.

Explosions to accomplish dispersion are likely to inactivate biological agents and therefore are not very effective in disseminating infectious materials. Contamination of water supplies generally requires an addition of an unrealistically large amount of biological agents to a city supply.

Less lethal toxins are sometimes described as neural inhibitors, gastrointestinal convulsives, neuropharmacological agonists, calumative agents, and disassociative hallucinogens. Their delivery systems are designed for use against armed enemies, rioters, and groups of potentially hostile civilians. Calumative agents include an array of psychoactive substances that induce sleep or create disabling hallucinations. An example is HZ (3-quinacridinyl benzoate, a compound related to scopolamine) previously developed during the Cold War.

SUMMARY OF INVENTION

A device for the aerial release of mosquitoes includes an unmanned aerial vehicle operable by remote control. It carries a container holding a central processing unit and a mosquito breeding bin, which is a self-contained volume housing mosquitoes and a mosquito food having a toxin suitable to be transmitted by mosquito bite after the mosquito consumes the mosquito food. A release tube is connected to the mosquito breeding bin and sized to release mosquitoes from the mosquito breeding bin. A valve is connected to the release tube and is operable by remote control so that when opened, the mosquitoes have an open pathway out of the container through the release tube. When the unmanned aerial vehicle has a lifting blade that causes a downdraft, then the release tube is preferably of a length such that the mosquitoes released therefrom avoid the downdraft from the lifting blade. A compressed gas source may be used to encourage the release of the mosquitoes out of the release tube.

Technical Problem

A mosquito delivery system for lethal and non-lethal applications is not available. If such a delivery systems enabling legal non-lethal uses were available, it could later be adapted for military uses should legal restraints be altered or eliminated. For example, one unquestionably legal application of the toxic mosquito delivery system is immunization made possible by adding a toxin, that is, a genetically modified bacterium capable of activating a person's immune system to fight malaria, to mosquitoes. These contaminated mosquitoes could be aerially released to immunize at risk populations against malaria.

Throughout military history, the health of one's troops has always been an important determining factor. Soldiers on the ground can only properly function if they are not ill, sick, or dying from a deadly virus or pathogen. A soldier, whose

De acuerdo a los documentos de la patente, el dron es capaz de esparcir toxinas letales y no letales, incluyendo cualquier agente que pueda ser llevado y administrado por un mosquito. El inventor del dron para la liberación de mosquitos tóxicos, S. Mill Calvert, ha patentado 42 inventos militares similares para el Ejército y las Fuerzas Especiales de los Estados Unidos, incluyendo [balas que provocan derrames cerebrales](#), en un lapso de sólo dos años entre 2013 y 2015. Sin embargo, no existe nadie con tal nombre en el registro de ciudadanos de los Estados Unidos. El abogado de patentes estadounidense, Louis Ventre, que presentó la

solicitud, se negó a comentar si este nombre era un seudónimo y quién era realmente su cliente (véanse los correos electrónicos que figuran a continuación).

Gmail - Request for an Interview

Page 1 of 1



Dilyana Gaytandzhieva <d.gaytandzhieva@gmail.com>

Request for an Interview

Louis Ventre, Jr. <lventre@lventre.com>
Reply-To: lventre@lventre.com
To: Dilyana Gaytandzhieva <d.gaytandzhieva@gmail.com>

12 April 2018 at 23:23

I cannot respond for Mr. Calvert. He has instructed me to tell you that he is not interested in being interviewed.

[Quoted text hidden]

Louis Ventre, Jr.: "No puedo responder por el Sr. Calvert. Él me ha pedido que le diga que no está interesado en ser entrevistado".

Gmail - Request for an Interview

Page 1 of 1



Dilyana Gaytandzhieva <d.gaytandzhieva@gmail.com>

Request for an Interview

Dilyana Gaytandzhieva <d.gaytandzhieva@gmail.com>
To: lventre@lventre.com

12 April 2018 at 23:48

Is Mr. S Mill Calvert the full name of the inventor or a pseudonym? It is strange that there are no records of such a person anywhere, he has so many inventions but no publications or scientific work in the public domain. Thank you again for taking the time answering my questions.

[Quoted text hidden]

DilyanaGaytandzhieva: "¿Es Sr. S Mill Calvert el nombre completo del inventor o es un seudónimo? Es extraño que no haya registros de tal persona en ningún lugar, tiene tantas invenciones pero ninguna publicación o trabajo científico en el dominio público. Gracias nuevamente por tomarse el tiempo de responder a mis preguntas".

Gmail - Request for an Interview

Page 1 of 1



Dilyana Gaytandzhieva <d.gaytandzhieva@gmail.com>

Request for an Interview

Louis Ventre, Jr. <lventre@lventre.com>
Reply-To: lventre@lventre.com
To: Dilyana Gaytandzhieva <d.gaytandzhieva@gmail.com>

13 April 2018 at 01:14

I am not authorized to tell you anything about my client.

[Quoted text hidden]

Louis Ventre, Jr.: "No estoy autorizado para decirle nada acerca de mi cliente".

Los documentos muestran una serie de proyectos del Pentágono que involucran a los insectos como posibles vectores de enfermedades en Georgia. En 2014, el Centro Lugar fue equipado con una instalación para insectos y lanzó un proyecto sobre moscas de arena en Georgia y el Cáucaso. En 2014-2015 se recolectaron especies de mosca de la arena en el marco de otro proyecto, "[Trabajo de vigilancia de la enfermedad febril aguda](#)", y todas las moscas de la arena (hembras) fueron sometidas a pruebas para determinar su tasa de capacidad de infección. Un tercer proyecto, que también incluye una colección de moscas de arena, estudió [las características de](#) sus glándulas salivales. **Las moscas de la arena llevan en su saliva parásitos peligrosos que pueden transmitir a los humanos a través de una mordedura.**



Desde el inicio del proyecto de las moscas en el Centro Lugar, Georgia ha estado infestada de moscas de la arena. Los residentes se quejan de las mordeduras de estas nuevas moscas cuando están desnudos en el baño.



Los científicos del Pentágono también han realizado experimentos con mosquitos y garrapatas tropicales en Georgia. En 2016, se recolectaron 21.590 garrapatas para una base de datos de ADN para estudios futuros en el Centro Lugar en el marco del proyecto del Pentágono "[Evaluación de la seroprevalencia y la diversidad genética del virus de la fiebre hemorrágica de Crimea-Congo \(CCHFV\) y de los Hantavirus de Georgia](#)". **Los proyectos del Pentágono relacionados con las garrapatas coincidieron con un brote inexplicable de fiebre hemorrágica de Crimea y el Congo, causada por una infección a través de un virus transmitido por**

GovTribe Federal Contract Opportunity: Special
Notice of Anticipated Commercial Work By U.
S. Army, West Desert Test Center (WDTC)
Located at Dugway Proving Ground, UT SOL:
USA-SNOTE-100113-001

Added: Oct 01, 2013 10:41 am

U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground is anticipating providing chemical and biological warfare agent or simulant testing through FY2014 for various private commercial industry (Non-Department of Defense) organizations. Test services may include munitions, meteorological, and/or Unmanned Aerial or Ground Vehicles/Systems. Services may require laboratory, chamber, field, range facilities and personnel support. If your organization has the capability to provide these types of services or support, if you have inquiries, or additional request(s) for information, they may be directed to:

Christopher M. Johnson, P.E.

Chief, Operations Division

TEDT-DPW-OP

Office: (435) 831-7246

Email: Christopher.M.Johnson154.civ@mail.mil

Arriba: [una oferta de trabajo comercial del ejército de los EE.UU.](#) para pruebas de campo con agentes biológicos y drones está publicada en un sitio web de contratos federales de los EE.UU. Documentos y fotos del ejército de los Estados Unidos muestran que el Pentágono ha desarrollado varios métodos de difusión de ataques de bioterrorismo, incluso con explosivos.

1. REPORT DATE 12 MAR 2012	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2011 to 00-00-2012
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Capabilities Report 2012, West Desert Test Center.		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
		5b. GRANT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, Office of the Technical Director, West Desert Test Center, Dugway, UT, 84022-5000		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

Dissemination by Explosives

Dissemination by explosives may be a single-point detonation of 1 to 55 gallons of chemical simulant, or small quantities launched from the Simulator Projectile Airburst Liquid (SPAL) system. For single-point detonations, explosive operators typically use a ratio of 1 lb of Composition 4 (C-4) explosives for every 4 lbs of simulant, up to 60 blocks for a 55-gallon container.



Simulator Projectile Airburst Liquid (SPAL) system

The trailer-mounted SPAL system consists of short launch tubes containing simulant-filled canisters and bursters. SPAL containers can be launched from a moving vehicle (1 to 10 mph) via the firing box located in the cab. Canisters explode at a predetermined height, disseminating up to one liter of chemical or biological simulant, such as acetic acid (AA), MeS, TEP, SF6, and *Bacillus thuringiensis* (Bt). The SPAL system can disseminate up to 100 grams of dry biological simulant, such as BG and OV.

Ammonium nitrate/fuel oil (ANFO) explosives may be used to detonate CB simulants from a particle-dispersal device (PDD) or a fluid-dispersal device (FDD). The PDD and FDD can be mounted to wooden towers or other elevated sacrificial structures for above-ground detonations. Simulant plumes have been created to test the

WMD Aerial Collection System (WACS), mounted to an unmanned aircraft system (UAS), which located and interrogated the plumes.

The air burst artillery simulator creates an air explosion of chemical or biological simulants at 500 feet representing a real-world threat and is used in the methodology stage of a test.

Fuente: [Reporte de Capacidades 2012, Centro de Pruebas West Desert](#)



© DugwayProvingGround

Diseminación de contaminantes para pruebas biológicas / químicas



© DugwayProvingGround

Diseminación de simulantes por explosivos



© DugwayProvingGround

Diseminación de líquidos



© DugwayProvingGround

Diseminación de polvo



© DugwayProvingGround

Diseminación en rejilla de pruebas

Además de tener varias capacidades militares para dispersar agentes biológicos, la DTRA también tiene acceso total a las fronteras rusas, concedido bajo un programa militar llamado [Proyecto de Seguridad Fronteriza Terrestre de Georgia](#). Las actividades relacionadas con este proyecto han sido subcontratadas a una empresa privada estadounidense, Parsons GovernmentServices International. Parsons ha obtenido un contrato de [17,7 millones de dólares](#) en el marco del proyecto de seguridad fronteriza del Pentágono en Georgia. La DTRA ha contratado anteriormente a Parsons para [proyectos similares de seguridad fronteriza en Líbano, Jordania, Libia y Siria](#). Curiosamente, un subcontratista que trabaja en [este proyecto de seguridad fronteriza, TMC Global Professional Services](#), también ha sido contratado por la DTRA para obtener [apoyo científico](#) en el Centro Lugar. La misma empresa norteamericana TMC, que trabaja en el Centro Lugar, también vigila las armas de destrucción masiva en las fronteras georgianas. El proyecto coincide con el incidente de la difusión de pólvora que se informó y filmó en la vecina Chechenia, cerca de la frontera georgiana.

Contratistas privados

La Agencia de Reducción de Amenazas de la Defensa (DTRA) ha subcontratado gran parte del trabajo bajo el programa militar a empresas privadas, que no responden ante el Congreso, y que pueden operar más libremente y moverse fuera del estado de derecho.

From: Gagnidze, Archil CTR USARMY MEDCOM WRAIR (GG)
<archil.gagnidze.ctr@mail.mil>
Sent: Friday, February 16, 2018 3:16 PM
To: sbelkania@moh.gov.ge; Mariana Mkumali
Cc: James, Norland V MAJ USARMY MEDCOM USAMRU-G (US)
Subject: Request for a meeting with Minister of Health of Georgia (UNCLASSIFIED)
Attachments: Senior Level Talking Points.pdf; MG HOLCOMB BIO.PDF

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE

ქალბატონო სოფიკო,

გაცნობებთ, რომ მიმდინარე წლის მარტის თვეში აშშ სახმელეთო ძალების სამედიცინო კვლევების და რესურსების სარდლობის მმართველი გენერალი ზარზარა ჰოლკომი სამუშაო ვიზიტით გეგმავს საქართველოში ჩამოსვლას. ვიზიტის მიზანია ვოლტერ რიდის საქართველოს დირექტორატის/განყოფილების მონახულება და ქართველ პარტნიორებთან შეხვედრა.

როგორც მოგეხსენებათ, ვოლტერ რიდის საქართველოს განყოფილება (U.S Army Medical Research Directorate – Georgia (USAMRD-G); ხშირად უწოდებენ WRAIR-Georgia-ს) განთავსებულია ლუგარის ცენტრში და მრავალი წელია ნაყოფიერად თანამშრომლობს როგორც დაავადებათა კონტროლის ცენტრთან, ასევე სხვა ქართულ ბიო-სამედიცინო კვლევით დაწესებულებებთან.

გთხოვთ, დაგეგხმართო გენერალ ჰოლკომის ბატონ დავით სერგენკოსთან შეხვედრის ორგანიზებაში. თუ შესაძლებელია, გვსურს, გთხოვოთ შეხვედრის 20 მარტს დილის საათებში ჩანიშვნა. ინფორმაცია განსახილველ საკითხებთან დაკავშირებით მოცემულია დანართში. თუმცა, აღსანიშნავია, რომ ეს არის გაცნობითი ხასიათის შეხვედრა. თანდართულია ასევე გენერალ ჰორკამის ბიოგრაფია.

აღნიშნულ ვიზიტთან დაკავშირებით ინფორმირებულია დაავადებათა კონტროლის ცენტრის დირექტორი ბატონი ამირან გამყრელიძე.

გთხოვთ მაცნობოთ, თუ გექნებათ დამატებითი შეკითხვები. დიდი მადლობა,

პატივისცემით,

V/R,

Archil Gagnidze

Business Manager

Contractor, TMC Global Professional Services U.S. Army Medical Research Directorate - Georgia (USAMRD-G)
16 Kakheti Highway, Tbilisi 0190, Georgia

Office: +995 32 2 24 34 11 (ext. 2040)

Mobile: +995 557 17 11 17

E-mail: archil.gagnidze.ctr@mail.mil

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Este correo electrónico, por ejemplo, fechado el 16 de febrero de 2018, fue enviado por un empleado del contratista privado, TMC Global Professional Services, de parte de la unidad del Pentágono en el Centro Lugar, para pedir una reunión con el Ministerio de Salud de Georgia. TMC obtuvo un contrato de 3,8 millones de dólares en 2016 hasta 2021 para servicios de apoyo en el Centro Lugar. Curiosamente, el mismo año, el Pentágono otorgó a la misma empresa privada otro contrato contra el narcoterrorismo por valor de 975 millones de dólares. ¿Por qué a una compañía que trabaja para el Pentágono en un programa para contrarrestar los narcóticos se le ha dado trabajo simultáneamente en un laboratorio militar que quema químicos por la noche?

Documentos filtrados revelan otra compañía involucrada en el programa en Georgia: Booz Allen Hamilton.



En junio de 2013, Edward Snowden, en aquel entonces un empleado de Booz Allen contratado para proyectos de la NSA, reveló públicamente datos de los programas de vigilancia masiva secreta y recolección de datos de EE.UU. alrededor del mundo.

El antiguo lugar de trabajo de Snowden, Booz Allen Hamilton, ha recibido [cinco lucrativos contratos](#) de la Agencia de Reducción de Amenazas de la Defensa (DTRA) desde 2010 hasta 2022, por un total de al menos 358 millones de dólares para servicios de [apoyo de inteligencia](#) y de [apoyo a agentes de armas químicas](#). Según el sitio web de la empresa, ha desarrollado una [plataforma basada en la web](#) para la Agencia de Reducción de Amenazas de la Defensa (DTRA) y la comunidad de inteligencia de los Estados Unidos. El sistema contiene actualmente más de 9 terabytes de datos de inteligencia y crece en cerca de 1,5 millones de registros cada semana.

El Pentágono ha gastado al menos [161 millones de dólares](#) en el Centro Lugar en Tbilisi bajo un contrato con el contratista privado estadounidense CH2M Hill. Esto representa la mitad de la suma total de [361,4 millones de dólares](#) que la compañía había recibido para operar los **laboratorios biológicos del Pentágono en Georgia, Uganda, Tanzania, Irak, Afganistán y el sudeste asiático.**

Según CH2M Hill, la compañía estadounidense ha asegurado agentes biológicos y ha contratado a antiguos científicos de guerra biológica en el Centro Lugar. Se trata de científicos que trabajan para otra compañía estadounidense que participa en el programa militar en Georgia: el Instituto Battelle Memorial.

<u>CONTRACTOR</u>	<u>NUMBER OF CONTRACTS</u>	<u>CONTRACT DATE</u>	<u>TERMINATION DATE</u>
Battelle Memorial Institute	11	Apr 1952	Oct 1952
		Apr 1952	Mar 1954
		Mar 1953	Mar 1954
		Apr 1953	Mar 1954
		Jul 1954	Aug 1955
		Oct 1954	Feb 1956
		Jun 1956	Sep 1958
		Apr 1957	Jul 1958
		Dec 1962	Jan 1966
		Sep 1964	Feb 1966
		Jun 1965	Aug 1965

Battelle, como subcontratista de 59 millones de dólares en el Centro Lugar, tiene una amplia experiencia en la investigación de agentes biológicos, ya que la compañía ha trabajado en el Programa de Armas Biológicas de EE.UU. bajo [11 contratos anteriores con el Ejército de EE.UU.](#) en el pasado. *Fuente: US Army Activities in the US, Biological Warfare Programs, vol. II, 1977, p. 82.*

La misma compañía también trabajó para la CIA bajo el [Proyecto Clear Vision](#) (1997-200). Su objetivo declarado era reconstruir una bomba de ántrax de la era soviética para probar sus características de diseminación. **La operación clandestina CIA-Battelle fue omitida de las declaraciones de la Convención sobre Armas Biológicas de Estados Unidos presentadas ante la ONU.**



La inauguración del Centro Lugar en Tbilisi en 2011. Andrew C. Weber (derecha), entonces secretario asistente de Defensa de EE.UU. (2009-2014), y coordinador sustituto para la respuesta al ébola del Departamento de Defensa de EE.UU. (2014-2015), es actualmente un empleado de Metabiota (contratista de EE.UU.).

La empresa estadounidense Metabiota Inc. ha recibido [23,9 millones de dólares en contratos federales](#) bajo el programa de la DTRA del Pentágono en Georgia y Ucrania para servicios de consultoría científica y técnica. Metabiota había sido contratada para realizar trabajos para la DTRA antes y durante la crisis del Ébola en África Occidental, y se le concedieron [3,2 millones de dólares \(2012-2015\) para trabajar en Sierra Leona](#) en el epicentro del brote del Ébola.



Metabiota trabajó en el proyecto del Pentágono en el epicentro de la crisis del ébola, donde se ubican tres laboratorios biológicos de EE.UU.

Periodista expulsada del Parlamento Europeo por confrontar a funcionarios de EE.UU. sobre las armas biológicas

Le pedí al subsecretario de Salud de los Estados Unidos, Robert Kadlec, que comentara durante una conferencia sobre armas biológicas en el Parlamento Europeo en Bruselas, y fui inmediatamente expulsada de la conferencia.

Armas biológicas étnicas

Los documentos revelan algunos de los proyectos financiados por el Pentágono. Entre ellos, proyectos relacionados con Rusia. La Fuerza Aérea de los Estados Unidos ha estado recolectando específicamente muestras de ARN ruso y de tejido sinovial, lo que lleva a que Moscú tema la existencia de un programa encubierto de armas biológicas dirigidas contra etnias.



Synovial Tissue / RNA Samples

Solicitation Number: FA3016-17-U-0164
Agency: Department of the Air Force
Office: Air Education and Training Command
Location: 502d Contracting Squadron

[Notice Details](#)

[Packages](#)

[Interested Vendors List](#)

[Complete View](#)

[Return To Opportunities List](#)

[Original Synopsis](#)
Combined
Synopsis/Solicitation
Jul 18, 2017
11:19 am

[Changed](#)
Jul 19, 2017
4:26 pm

Solicitation Number: FA3016-17-U-0164
Notice Type: Modification/Amendment

Synopsis:
Added: Jul 19, 2017 4:26 pm
Amendment No. 0001 to RFQ FA3016-17-U-0164 is hereby released as follows:

(1) Provide answers to industry generated questions below:

Q1: For the RNA samples: do you require a minimum amount?

A1: Please see Attachment No. 2 "Schedule of Supplies" to the original solicitation. The Government requires 12 each Normal Human Ribonucleic Acid (RNA) Samples.

Q2: Would you consider samples from Ukraine?

A2: No, all samples (Synovial tissue and RNA samples) shall be collected from Russia and must be Caucasian. The Government will not consider tissue samples from Ukraine.

Q3: Would you accept prospective collection or only samples from a retrospective collections?

A3: The Government will only accept retrospective collections.

SCHEDULE OF SUPPLIES

Delivery Schedule:

Proposed calendar days after receipt of order (ARO) to complete CLIN(s) 0001 and 0002: _____ Days
 The Government requires FOB Destination and a delivery date of ten (10) calendar days after receipt of order (ARO).

CONTRACT LINE ITEM NUMBER (CLIN)	Description Origin / Race	QTY	U/I	U/P	TOTAL PRICE
0001	Normal Human Fresh Frozen Synovial Tissue (Russian / Caucasian)	27	EA		
0002	Normal Human Ribonucleic Acid (RNA) Samples (Russian / Caucasian)	12	EA		

*Note: The Contractor shall provide at time of delivery the demographic information for each Synovial Tissue and RNA sample provided under this order, such as sample ID, sex, age, ethnicity, diagnosis, date of surgery, date of diagnosis, symptoms, smoking history, medical history, current medications, height, weight, BMI, sample type, matrix, concentration in ng/ul (RNA) or weight (tissue), volume (RNA), and total concentration (RNA).

© fbo.gov

El Pentágono también ha estudiado la [cepa de ántrax ruso](#) en el Centro Lugar, para la cual Rusia tiene una vacuna, [una cepa rusa de YersiniaPestis](#) (que causa la peste), así como la [secuencia genómica de la cepa rusa del virus de la fiebre hemorrágica de Crimea y del Congo](#).

GenBank ↖

Yersinia pestis 2944, complete genome

GenBank: CP006792.1

[FASTA](#) [Graphics](#)

Go to: ☺

```

LOCUS       CP006792                4491639 bp    DNA     circular BCT 23-SEP-2015
DEFINITION  Yersinia pestis 2944, complete genome.
ACCESSION   CP006792
VERSION     CP006792.1
DBLINK      BioProject: PRJNA208249
            BioSample: SAMN03941711
KEYWORDS    .
SOURCE      Yersinia pestis 2944
  ORGANISM  Yersinia pestis 2944
            Bacteria; Proteobacteria; Gammaproteobacteria; Enterobacteriales;
            Yersiniaceae; Yersinia.
REFERENCE   1 (bases 1 to 4491639)
  AUTHORS   Zhgenti,E., Johnson,S.L., Davenport,K.W., Chanturia,G.,
            Daligault,H.E., Chain,P.S. and Nikolich,M.P.
  TITLE     Genome Assemblies for 11 Yersinia pestis Strains Isolated in the
            Caucasus Region
  JOURNAL   Genome Announc 3 (5), e01030-15 (2015)
  PUBMED   26383663
  REMARK    Publication Status: Online-Only
REFERENCE   2 (bases 1 to 4491639)
  AUTHORS   Farlow,J., Nikolich,M., Teshima,H., Munk,C., Held,B., Chertkov,O.,
            Davenport,K., Lu,M., Gu,W., Zeytun,A., Bruce,D.C., Johnson,S.L.,
            Deter,C., Tapia,R., Chain,P. and Han,C.
  TITLE     Direct Submission
  JOURNAL   Submitted (18-OCT-2013) BioScience, Los Alamos National Laboratory,
            PO Box 1663 M888, Los Alamos, NM 87545, USA
COMMENT     Source DNA is available from Dr Mikeljon Nikolich
            (mikeljon.p.nikolich.civ@mail.mil).

##Genome-Assembly-Data-START##
Assembly Method      :: Velvet v. 1.1.05; Newbler v.
                    2.3-PreRelease-6/30/2009; Parallel phrap
                    v. SPS - 4.24
Genome Coverage      :: 68.8; 23.4
Sequencing Technology :: Illumina GAii; Roche 454
##Genome-Assembly-Data-END##

FEATURES             Location/Qualifiers
     source            1..4491639
                     /organism="Yersinia pestis 2944"
                     /mol_type="genomic DNA"
                     /strain="2944"
                     /db_xref="taxon:1345702"
                     /country="Russia: Kabardino-Balkaria"
                     /note="Biovar: Medievalis"
     gene              281..790
                     /locus_tag="M478_1"
     CDS               281..790
                     /locus_tag="M478_1"
    
```

De acuerdo al estudio del genoma, el "ADN ruso está disponible de manos del Dr. Mikeljon Nikolich". Él es uno de los científicos del Pentágono en el Centro Lugar y tiene la tarea de la investigación del genoma en cepas en colecciones de patógenos de ex países de la URSS, como revela el siguiente documento filtrado.

Cooperative Research and Development Agreement between the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) and the National Center for Disease Control and Public Health (NCDC) of the Republic of Georgia

**APPENDIX A
SCOPE OF WORK**

Title: "Collaborative Genetic Characterization of NCDCPH Strain Collections of *Bacillus anthracis*, *Brucella* species, *Francisella tularensis* and *Yersinia pestis*"

Background: The National Center for Disease Control and Public Health (NCDCPH) in Georgia has a collection of unique regional *Yersinia pestis*, *Francisella tularensis*, *Brucella* species and *Bacillus anthracis* strains that require further genetic characterization including genotyping and genomic sequencing. WRAIR is funded by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) in project CBCALL12-DIAGB1-2-0194, "Diagnostic and Genetic Characterization of Global BSAT Strain Collections." (PI: Dr. Mikeljon Nikolich) to genetically characterize strains in pathogen collections of countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) including those in Georgia, and DTRA has agreed that this joint WRAIR-NCDCPH work should proceed under this project. NCDCPH and WRAIR have already worked collaboratively in the characterization of BSAT strains under DTRA project CBM.DIAGB.03.10.WR.002, "Coordinated Assessment of FSU BSAT Strain Collections and Targeted Genomic Sequencing" (PI: Nikolich FY10-11) and wish to formalize and extend this particular collaborative effort to allow expanded collaboration as defined in the scope below. This collaboration will benefit the mission of WRAIR in the ongoing collection of information on these pathogens within this DoD project and will also be a part of future collaborative efforts between WRAIR and NCDCPH in the establishment of the long-term WRAIR military research presence in the Central Public Health Reference Laboratory in Tbilisi, Georgia.

SCOPE:

WRAIR (Laboratory) agrees to:

- 1) Provide to NCDCPH the reagents and supplies for genetic typing and other characterization of NCDCPH *Yersinia pestis*, *Francisella tularensis*, *Brucella* species and *Bacillus anthracis* strains as agreed by both partners, including Single Nucleotide Polymorphism (SNP) and Variable Number Tandem Repeat (VNTR) analysis, growth and phenotypic analysis and DNA sequencing.
- 2) Provide to NCDCPH training and travel as needed for diagnostic testing, genetic typing and other characterization of NCDC *Yersinia pestis*, *Francisella tularensis*, *Brucella* species and *Bacillus anthracis* strains as agreed by the partners, including Single Nucleotide Polymorphism (SNP) and Variable Number Tandem Repeat (VNTR) analysis, growth and phenotypic analysis, DNA sequencing and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) analyses.
- 3) Provide to NCDCPH diagnostic assays for testing NCDCPH *Yersinia pestis*, *Francisella*

Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever nairovirus isolate UCCR4405 segment L, complete sequence

GenBank: KY484030.1

[FASTA](#) [Graphics](#)

Go to: 

```

LOCUS       KY484030                12151 bp    cRNA    linear    VRL 02-APR-2017
DEFINITION  Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever nairovirus isolate UCCR4405 segment
            L, complete sequence.
ACCESSION   KY484030
VERSION     KY484030.1
KEYWORDS    .
SOURCE      Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever orthonairovirus
  ORGANISM  Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever orthonairovirus
            Viruses; ssRNA viruses; ssRNA negative-strand viruses;
            Bunyvirales; Nairoviridae; Orthonairovirus.
REFERENCE   1 (bases 1 to 12151)
  AUTHORS   Koehler,J.W., Delp,K.L., Kearney,B.J., Conrad,T.A., Schoepp,R.J.,
            Garrison,A.R., Altimura,L.A., Rossi,C.A. and Minogue,T.D.
  TITLE     Genome Sequences of eight Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus
            strains
  JOURNAL   Unpublished
REFERENCE   2 (bases 1 to 12151)
  AUTHORS   Koehler,J.W., Delp,K.L., Kearney,B.J., Conrad,T.A., Schoepp,R.J.,
            Garrison,A.R., Altimura,L.A., Rossi,C.A. and Minogue,T.D.
  TITLE     Direct Submission
  JOURNAL   Submitted (19-JAN-2017) DSD, USAMRIID, 1425 Porter Street,
            Frederick, MD 21702, USA
COMMENT     GenBank Accession Numbers KY484028-KY484030 represent sequences
            from the 3 segments of Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever nairovirus
            isolate UCCR4405.

            ##Assembly-Data-START##
            Assembly Method      :: CLC Genomics Workbench v. 7.5
            Coverage              :: >100
            Sequencing Technology :: Illumina
            ##Assembly-Data-END##
FEATURES             Location/Qualifiers
     source           1..12151
                     /organism="Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever
                     orthonairovirus"
                     /mol_type="viral cRNA"
                     /strain="Drosdov"
                     /isolate="UCCR4405"
                     /host="Homo sapiens"
                     /db_xref="taxon:1980519"
                     /segment="L"
                     /country="Russia"
                     /collection_date="1967"
                     /PCR_primers="fwd_name: CCHF-L 1F, fwd_seq:
                     tctcaagatatcaatcccccc, rev_name: CCHF-L 2R, rev_seq:
                     tctcaagaaatcgttccccccac"
    
```

En 2017 científicos del Pentágono secuenciaron el genoma de una cepa rusa de la fiebre hemorrágica de Crimea y el Congo.

Los correos electrónicos filtrados entre el director del Centro Lugar AmiranGamkrelidze y el Ministro de Salud de Georgia, David Sergeenko, **también revelan un proyecto en curso del Pentágono sobre la fiebre hemorrágica de Crimea-Congo en el país.**

7/7/2018

WRAIR შეხვედრისთვის

WRAIR შეხვედრისთვის

✕ DELETE ← REPLY ⇐ REPLY ALL → FORWARD ⋮



Amiran Gamkrelidze <A.Gamkrelidze@ncdc.ge>

Mark as unread

Mon 3/19/2018 3:09 PM

To: David Sergeenko;

Cc: Sopo Belkania <sbelkania@moh.gov.ge>;

3 attachments

MG
HOLCOMB
102.pdf

Senior
Leve - pdf

ბატონი
ბინი - docx

Download all

ბატონო დავით,

გიგზავნით 20 მარტს, სამშაბათს, ვოლტერ რიდის ინსტიტუტის ხელმძღვანელობასთან შეხვედრისთვის მომზადებულ გარკვეულ მასალას:

1. ბარბარა ჰოლკომბის ბიოს და მის მიერ შემოთავაზებულ განსახილველ საკითხებს;
2. ვოლტერ რიდთან თანამშრომლობის მოკლე მიმოხილვას.

პატივისცემით,
ამირანი

WRAIR / USAMRU-G mandate in Georgia

- WRAIR is committed to a long-term presence in Georgia;
- Its goal is to advance research and improve the lab capacity and medical capabilities in the country;
- It will comply with Lugar Center safety, security, biosecurity and other policies procedures and regulations;
- WRAIR will collaborate with NCDC on science projects which are of mutual interest and benefit, and will assist Georgian scientists to increase the Lugar Center's scientific capacity through cooperative projects;
- After the expiration of the Joint Transition Agreement between the US and Georgian Governments on transitioning the responsibilities over the maintenance of the Unified Laboratory System and the R. Lugar Center, WRAIR to support the NCDC with covering the maintenance costs.

Joint Research Projects (current) with NCDC:

1. Acute Febrile Illness and vector-borne disease which has a Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever component involving NCDC.
2. Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) which involves collaborative training and sample collection from NCDC Zonal diagnostic laboratories.

Planned Research Projects with NCDC:

1. Next generation sequencing; this project will involve collaboration with NCDC scientists to stand-up the USAMRD-G sequencing capacity.
2. Molecular enterics-which will involve the analysis of culture negative stool samples.

Future Plans:

1. Vivarium capacity strengthening including facilitation of trainings
2. Develop regulations and policies in the fields of biosafety and biosecurity, good laboratory practice, facilitate trainings for Vivarium development

Los georgianos son utilizados como conejillos de Indias de laboratorios

Los correos electrónicos del ministro también revelan otro proyecto estadounidense sobre la hepatitis C en Georgia, incluyendo casos de muerte. El estudio piloto del Centro para el Control de Enfermedades de EE.UU. en Georgia se llama "Diagnóstico simplificado y monitorización de pacientes infectados con hepatitis C en entornos rurales de atención primaria utilizando una terapia antiviral pangenotípica recientemente aprobada". Se designa como información confidencial. El Ministerio de Salud de Georgia ha firmado un acuerdo con el Centro de Control de Enfermedades de los Estados Unidos y la empresa farmacéutica privada estadounidense Gilead. De acuerdo con este acuerdo, la parte estadounidense proporciona medicamentos gratuitos para el tratamiento de la hepatitis C. A cambio, la empresa privada estadounidense no puede ser considerada responsable de ningún daño (intencional o no) que pueda resultar del programa. El acuerdo está firmado por David Sergeenko, de la parte georgiana.



El Ministro de Salud de Georgia, David Sergeenko, en un [anuncio de medicamentos de Gilead](#) que promueve el éxito del programa.

Execution Copy

Memorandum of Understanding

This Memorandum of Understanding (this “MOU”) is effective as of April 21, 2015 (the “Effective Date”) by and between Gilead Sciences Ireland UC (“Gilead”) and the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs of the Republic of Georgia (the “MOH”). Gilead and MOH are each referred to individually herein as a “Party” and collectively as the “Parties.”

1. Background. The Parties are collaborating with The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention of the United States (“CDC”) to develop and implement a multi-year program aimed at eliminating Hepatitis C Infection (“HCV”) in the Republic of Georgia, including anticipated treatment of up to 20,000 patients per year (the “HCV Program”). The Parties recognize that there is an urgent need to treat patients with HCV in the Republic of Georgia, and desire to commence treatment of up to 5,000 Qualified Patients (as defined below) under an initial program (“Initial Program”) prior to finalizing the definitive agreement(s) for the broader HCV Program, all in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth below. The Parties acknowledge that MOH will carry out the Initial Program with the support of CDC pursuant to a separate Memorandum of Understanding between MOH and CDC.

2. Donation of Product. Gilead, directly or through a locally appointed agent in the Republic of Georgia, will supply to MOH, free of charge, bottles of Sovaldi (tablets of 400 mg of sofosbuvir) (“Product”) in the quantities set forth in Section 8 below to treat up to 5,000 Qualified Patients (as defined below) in accordance with the terms of this MOU. Gilead’s donation of Product hereunder is provided solely to advance the bona fide goals and objectives of the MOH, and is not intended to reward or influence, and is not contingent upon, the purchase, prescription, approval, recommendation, or other favorable treatment of Gilead’s products by the MOH, CDC or any of their affiliated entities.

3. Qualified Patients. MOH agrees to distribute Product (a) only within the Republic of Georgia; (b) only to patients meeting mutually agreeable screening criteria focusing on those patients that are most in need (the “Qualified Patients”) who will receive the Product at no cost (the “Government Program”); and (c) only for the treatment of HCV (whether mono-infected or co-infected, provided in each case that such treatment is consistent with the Product label and available data therefor). The Parties acknowledge and agree that MOH is committed to, and anticipates, treating Qualified Patients with the Product through the Government Program in a manner consistent with the Product label or treatment protocols that have been approved by the applicable regulatory authority in the Republic of Georgia, and in distributing the Product to Qualified Patients shall provide any additional documentation as may be required by such regulatory authority (e.g., local translations of Product documentation as provided by Gilead). MOH agrees to monitor each patient that initiates and/or completes treatment for HCV with Product supplied under this MOU to determine the outcomes of such treatment and provide Gilead with the reports specified in Section 4 below.

4. Reports; Meetings. MOH will provide Gilead with regular, and in any event at least monthly, reports on the progress of the Initial Program, including providing information on the number of patients initiating treatment, number of patients treated and cure rates, as well as such other information as Gilead may reasonably request. MOH shall obtain all information contained in the reports provided to Gilead in accordance with applicable laws, including applicable privacy laws. Gilead may use and disclose the reports provided by MOH (and the information contained therein) for any commercially reasonable purpose. In addition, the Parties will have meetings, which may include CDC, as reasonably necessary or

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(e) Each calendar quarter and upon expiry or termination of this MOU MOH will provide a summary of all safety information that MOH has sent to Gilead, for reconciliation purposes, on the form provided to: standards.&collaborationsDSPH@gilead.com.

(f) Gilead will provide, at mutually agreeable times, training materials for MOH on the safety reporting requirements. All employees involved in the program must complete the training and the certification at least annually. Training certificates should be forwarded by e-mail to Gilead Standards and Collaborations: standards.&collaborationsDSPH@gilead.com.

12. Indemnification. Each Party hereby agrees to indemnify, defend and hold the other Party harmless from and against any and all losses, liabilities, costs and expenses arising from third party claims as a result of such Party's material breach of this MOU, except to the extent such losses result from the negligence or willful misconduct of the other Party.

13. Limitation of Liability. GILEAD SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY CONSEQUENTIAL, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, PUNITIVE OR INDIRECT DAMAGES IN CONNECTION WITH THIS MOU WHETHER FORESEEABLE OR NOT, AND WHETHER ARISING IN CONTRACT, TORT, OR NEGLIGENCE. For clarity, nothing in this Section 13 shall be construed to limit Gilead's obligation to continue to supply Product following termination of this MOU for MOH's breach to the extent necessary for Qualified Patients who are receiving therapy at the time of the termination to complete their prescribed course of therapy in accordance with the Product's approved label or treatment protocols as set forth in Section 10 above.

14. Confidentiality. This MOU and all information disclosed by one Party to the other in relation to this MOU shall be treated by the Parties as confidential. Unless expressly authorized in this MOU or by the disclosing Party to do so, the receiving Party shall not disclose to third parties any information disclosed by the other Party under this MOU. The obligations under this Section 14 shall not apply to the extent that any such information becomes part of the public domain without breach of this Section 14 by the receiving Party.

15. Governing Law; Arbitration. This MOU will be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of England and Wales, without regard to any conflict of laws provisions. The Parties agree that any dispute or controversy arising out of, in relation to, or in connection with this MOU, shall be finally settled by binding arbitration in London, England under the then current rules of the International Chamber of Commerce by three (3) arbitrators appointed in accordance with such rules. The decision of the arbitrator shall be final, conclusive and binding on the Parties. Judgment may be entered on the arbitrator's decision in any court of competent jurisdiction. The written decision of the panel of arbitrators shall be final, conclusive, and binding on the parties and may be enforced in any court of competent jurisdiction. Each Party shall bear its own costs in respect of the arbitration, including administrative and arbitrator's fees.

16. Miscellaneous. This MOU constitutes the entire and only agreement between the Parties relating to the subject matter hereof, and supersedes all prior negotiations, representations, agreements and understandings with respect to such subject matter. No agreements altering or supplementing the terms hereof may be made except by means of a written document signed by the duly authorized representatives of each Party. Nothing in this MOU shall be construed to grant to MOH any license to use Gilead's name, trademarks, or logo, in any format. All obligations of the Parties with respect to the subject matter set forth herein are set forth in this MOU. Each Party agrees to perform its obligations under this MOU in


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El ministro David Sergeenko firmó un acuerdo con Gilead que absuelve a la compañía farmacéutica estadounidense de cualquier investigación, lo que quiere decir que no se puede responsabilizar a Gilead por cualquier daño (intencional o no) que pueda ser producto del programa.

accordance with all applicable laws, rules and regulations. No Party may transfer or assign this MOU to a third party without the prior written consent of the other Parties, except that Gilead may transfer or assign this MOU to an affiliate of Gilead without prior written consent from the other Parties.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, authorized representatives of the Parties have executed this Memorandum of Understanding as of the Effective Date.

**ON BEHALF OF
GILEAD SCIENCES IRELAND UC**

By: 
Name: John C. Martin, Ph.D.

Title: Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer, Gilead Sciences, Inc.


By: 
Name: Gregg H. Alton

Title: Executive Vice President,
Corporate and Medical Affairs,
Gilead Sciences, Inc.

**ON BEHALF OF THE MINISTRY OF
LABOUR, HEALTH AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS
OF GEORGIA**

By: 
Name: Irakli Garibashvili

Title: Prime Minister of Georgia

By: 
Name: Davit Sergeenko

Title: Minister of Labour, Health
and Social Affairs

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Desde París con amor

Los correos electrónicos filtrados entre el ministro Sergeenko y el Centro para el Control de Enfermedades de los Estados Unidos (CDC), que apoya el programa Hepatitis C en Georgia, revelan reuniones privadas en París entre los funcionarios del gobierno y Gilead.

8/9/2018

David Sergeenko - Outlook Web App

FW: Gilead Meeting with Georgia MoH and US CDC @ EASL (14:00 - 15:00 Paris time) x

This event occurs in the past.

Accepted on Thu 4/5/2018, 4:03 PM

← REPLY ←← REPLY ALL → FORWARD ...

 **AOEM Master Calendar**
Mon 4/2/2018 10:09 PM

 **When:** Thu 4/12/2018 4:00 PM-5:00 PM
Where: Room 747, Paris Expo Porte de Versailles, 2 Place de la Porte de Versailles, 75015 Paris

✓ ACCEPT ? TENTATIVE ✗ DECLINE

Event Attendees

Reminder: Show as: Mark as private

[Bing Maps](#) [Action Items](#) + Get more apps

Dear Dr. Sergeenko and Dr. Amiran,
Please see calendar invite for meeting in Paris, on 2 April. I am cc'ing others for awareness. We can work on an agenda.
Thank you Betty for helping organize and a meeting room.
We look forward to meeting everyone.

Best, FA

-----Original Appointment-----

From: AOEM Master Calendar <AOEMMasterCalendar@gilead.com>

Sent: Monday, April 2, 2018 1:34 PM

To: AOEM Master Calendar; Betty Chiang; Aysan Murtezaoglu; Graeme Robertson; Clifford Samuel; Glass, Nancy (CDC/OID/NCHHSTP); Averhoff, Francisco (CDC/OID/NCHHSTP); Nasrullah, Muazzam (CDC/OID/NCHHSTP)

Cc: Misha Tsurulnikov

Subject: Gilead Meeting with Georgia MoH and US CDC @ EASL (14:00 - 15:00 Paris time)

When: Thursday, April 12, 2018 2:00 PM-3:00 PM (UTC+01:00) Brussels, Copenhagen, Madrid, Paris.

Where: Room 747, Paris Expo Porte de Versailles, 2 Place de la Porte de Versailles, 75015 Paris

<https://mail2.moh.gov.ge/owa/!CalendarItemDetailsViewModelFactory&ItemID=AQMkADQ4OWYzMThtLWNINDEINGExZS1QZWQzLTc1...> 1/1

Informes confidenciales: Al menos 100 casos de muerte en Georgia

Documentos confidenciales filtrados muestran al menos 100 muertes reportadas a Gilead, en los últimos 3 años, de pacientes bajo tratamiento con los medicamentos de Gilead Sovaldi y Harvoni, que les habían sido proporcionados gratuitamente.

Los georgianos han sido utilizados como conejillos de India de laboratorio para un nuevo tratamiento experimental de la hepatitis C por la empresa privada estadounidense junto con el Centro para el Control de Enfermedades de los Estados Unidos. Además, en algunos de los informes de esos casos enviados a Gilead por el Ministerio de Salud de Georgia, se indica que la causa de la muerte es desconocida o no está relacionada con el tratamiento. 30 georgianos murieron durante los ensayos clínicos del fármaco, sólo en diciembre de 2015. Otros 30 casos de muerte fueron reportados en abril de 2016, también en el lapso de sólo un mes. Cabe destacar que los fármacos no son ni fármacos de reanimación de emergencia para pacientes

en estado de muerte clínica, ni fármacos paliativos para el cáncer. La mayoría de las causas de muerte siguen siendo desconocidas y algunos diagnósticos no están relacionados con la Clasificación Internacional de Enfermedades de la OMS.


Drug Safety & Public Health

THIS INFORMATION IS INTENDED TO BE A CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION ONLY TO THE PERSON OR ENTITY TO WHOM IT IS ADDRESSED. IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS DOCUMENT IN ERROR, PLEASE NOTIFY THE SENDER AND DISCARD/SHRED THE RECEIVED DOCUMENT. IF THERE ARE ANY PROBLEMS WITH THE TRANSMISSION OR IF ANY PAGES ARE MISSING, PLEASE CONTACT THE SENDER.

Date: 7 February 2017 MCN: 2017-0255564

Dear Giorgi Khatelishvili,

To comply with our global regulatory reporting obligations and as part of our pharmacovigilance process, we are required to report adverse events that may be associated with our product. Patient confidentiality will be maintained in accordance with applicable laws/policies.*

We received the following report on **27-JAN-2017** for your patient who was treated with **Harvoni**.

Patient: **GK** DOB: **05-AUG-1971** Age: **46** Gender: **Male**

Adverse Event(s): **Hyperbilirubinemia gastrointestinal bleeding [Gastrointestinal bleeding], Vein thrombosis, Hyperbilirubinemia gastrointestinal bleeding [Hyperbilirubinemia]**

Following review of the reported information, we would like to request additional information regarding the above mentioned events:

1. Does patient have a history of esophageal varices, gastric or duodenal ulcers or gastrointestinal bleeding of any kind?
2. Is patient receiving aspirin, NSAIDs, anti-coagulation or anti-platelet therapy?
3. Please provide serum bilirubin levels at baseline and at time of occurrence of the fatal events
4. Does patient have a medical history of deep venous thrombosis or thromboembolic disease of any kind?
5. Please complete the following sections below:

Patient Information:

Initials: GK Date of Birth: 05-08-71 Age Group: Child (<18 yrs.)
DD/MMM/YYYY Adult (≥ 18 yrs. < 65 yrs.)
 Elderly (≥ 65 yrs.)

Sex: Male Female

Race: Caucasian Hispanic Of African Descent Asian Other (specify) _____

Age at onset of event: 46 (yrs.) Height: 176 in cm Weight: 86 lb kg

Adverse Event(s): Adverse Event Description (provide diagnosis, if known) Append separate sheet, if necessary	Causality Was the event considered related to Gilead drug? (Yes/No)	Resulted in (Check any that apply) ¹ (A) Hospitalization (B) Disability (C) Life-threatening (D) Congenital Anomaly ² (E) Death	Outcome (A) Resolved (B) Not Resolved (C) Unknown (D) Fatal (died due to event)	Event Start Date (DD/MMM/YYYY)	Event Stop Date (DD/MMM/YYYY)
1. gastrointestinal bleeding	No	A <input type="checkbox"/> B <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> E <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	A <input type="checkbox"/> B <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Unknown	17/01/17
2. Hyperbilirubinemia	No	A <input type="checkbox"/> B <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> E <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	A <input type="checkbox"/> B <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Unknown	17/01/17
3. liver cirrhosis	No	A <input type="checkbox"/> B <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> E <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	A <input type="checkbox"/> B <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Unknown	17/01/17
4. vein thrombosis	No	A <input type="checkbox"/> B <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> E <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	A <input type="checkbox"/> B <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Unknown	17/01/17
5.		A <input type="checkbox"/> B <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> E <input type="checkbox"/>	A <input type="checkbox"/> B <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/>		
6.		A <input type="checkbox"/> B <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> E <input type="checkbox"/>	A <input type="checkbox"/> B <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/>		
7.		A <input type="checkbox"/> B <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> E <input type="checkbox"/>	A <input type="checkbox"/> B <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/>		
8.		A <input type="checkbox"/> B <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> E <input type="checkbox"/>	A <input type="checkbox"/> B <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/>		

¹Hospitalization dates: ___/___/___ to ___/___/___
DD MMM YYYY DD MMM YYYY

²For Fatal events please provide autopsy report and date of death: 17 / 01 / 2017
DD MMM YYYY

*Please be aware that information provided to Gilead relating to you, may be used to comply with applicable laws and regulations. By providing us with information you are consenting to the control and processing of this personal or sensitive data by Gilead in accordance with applicable data protection laws and the Gilead privacy policy, available to you either on www.gilead.com/gp/privacy or upon request.
Version 2 APR 2016 Page 1 of 2

MCN: 2017-0255564

Summary of Event(s) / Other Relevant Information:
 Please provide a short summary of the event(s) and include any treatment given, **relevant medical history, risk factors,** and the results of any supportive laboratory data or other investigations (append results separately, if necessary).
 Hyperbilirubinemia gastrointestinal bleeding, vein thrombosis the patient was relapsed and had history of liver cirrhosis before treatment initiation
No Autopsy was performed

If medical intervention was required to prevent the reported event becoming serious, please check here and briefly describe the clinical course.

Medication Details - including Gilead drug(s):
 List all medications (including non-prescription and herbal/preparations) the patient was receiving at the time of the event(s). Append separate sheet, if necessary.

Name	Dose	Route	Start Date (DD/MM/YYYY)	Stop Date (DD/MM/YYYY)	Indication	Lot/Batch No.	Suspect Drug* Yes/No
1. Sof/Led	400/90	PO	21-10-16	17-01-17	Chronic Hep C	WCZX	No
2.							
3.							
4.							
5.							
6.							
7.							
8.							

* Yes = Considered to be causally associated with the reported event(s) No = Considered to NOT be causally associated with the reported event(s)

Action taken with Gilead Drug(s):
 Due to the event, was the dosage of the Gilead drug(s):
 Continued unchanged Discontinued Reduced (new dosage _____) Unknown

If the dose was reduced or drug discontinued, did the symptoms:
 Resolve Improve Remain the same

If the Gilead drug was restarted, did the event reappear? No Yes (please provide details)

If the requested information is not available, please provide a response to this query indicating that the requested information is not available.

Please respond via E-mail: Safety_FC@gilead.com or Fax: 1-650-522-5477

If you need to speak with someone, please call 650-522-5114 and leave a voice message including the MCN number noted on the form, the Gilead product involved, your name, and your phone number. Thank you for your assistance with this case.

Kind regards,
 Carmen Leung

*Please be aware that information provided to Gilead relating to you, may be used to comply with applicable laws and regulations. By providing us with information you are consenting to the control and processing of this personal or sensitive data by Gilead in accordance with applicable data protection laws and the Gilead privacy policy, available to you either on www.gilead.com/privacy or upon request.
 Version 2 May 2016 Page 2 of 2

Una discrepancia en un reporte de caso de muerte de 2017 del Ministerio de Salud de Georgia a Gilead plantea preguntas. ¿Cómo puede un paciente muerto continuar su tratamiento después de su muerte?

Serial No.	MCN#	Product	Start Date (DDMMYY)	Age	Sex	Start Date (DDMMYY)	Recommended Regimen	Response	Discontinued in	Reason for Discontinuation	Event Date (DDMMYY)	Event Type	Event Status	Event Description	Event Date (DDMMYY)	Event Type	Event Status	Event Description
1	1000000001	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
2	1000000002	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
3	1000000003	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
4	1000000004	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
5	1000000005	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
6	1000000006	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
7	1000000007	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
8	1000000008	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
9	1000000009	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
10	1000000010	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
11	1000000011	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
12	1000000012	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
13	1000000013	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
14	1000000014	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
15	1000000015	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
16	1000000016	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
17	1000000017	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
18	1000000018	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
19	1000000019	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
20	1000000020	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
21	1000000021	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
22	1000000022	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
23	1000000023	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
24	1000000024	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
25	1000000025	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
26	1000000026	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
27	1000000027	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
28	1000000028	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
29	1000000029	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis
30	1000000030	SOF/LED	10/21/16	55	M	10/21/16	SOF/LED 400/90	Stable	17/01/17	Death	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis	17/01/17	Death	Completed	Death due to decompensated cirrhosis

Sólo en abril de 2016 se reportaron 30 casos de muerte. De acuerdo con los reportes, sin embargo, la causa de la muerte no estaba vinculada al tratamiento o fue desconocida.


Para empeorar las cosas, la agencia gubernamental estadounidense ha lanzado el proyecto ostensiblemente altruista de medicamentos gratuitos para los georgianos pobres en asociación con la empresa privada estadounidense Gilead, por lo que se encuentra en conflicto directo de intereses. [Un informe financiero para 2017](#) revela que la misma compañía Gilead está entre los principales patrocinadores de la Fundación del Centro para el Control de Enfermedades.

El mayor accionista de Gilead es el ex ministro de Defensa de Estados Unidos, Donald Rumsfeld.

El 5 de septiembre de 2018, el Departamento Anticorrupción de la Agencia de Seguridad Nacional de Georgia anunció que había iniciado [una investigación sobre el programa de lucha contra la hepatitis C](#).

El Centro Lugar de Tbilisi, financiado por los Estados Unidos, puede haber estado involucrado en experimentos ilegales con ciudadanos georgianos, según ha afirmado el ex ministro de seguridad del país, Igor Giorgadze, citando documentos filtrados que obtuvo. Dijo que logró adquirir más de [100.000 páginas de documentos](#) sobre la investigación realizada en el Centro Richard Lugar.

El ministro de Salud de Georgia, David Sergeenko, no respondió a mis preguntas. Los correos electrónicos filtrados muestran la reacción del ministro.



El ministro reenvió el correo electrónico a su centro de prensa maldiciendo en mi contra en georgiano: "¿Quién demonios es ella y dónde obtuvo mi correo electrónico?"

Coincidentemente me encerraron inexplicablemente en el dormitorio de mi piso alquilado en Tbilisi mientras dormía y fui liberada por los servicios de emergencia que accedieron a la habitación cerrada desde el techo.

Dilyana Gaytandzhieva: Cómo me encerraron en el dormitorio de mi apartamento alquilado en #Tbilisi mientras investigaba un programa militar estadounidense que incluía un estudio piloto con 100 informes de casos de muerte. Los bomberos bajaron desde el techo y me salvaron. Gracias al servicio de Emergencias de Georgia por la rápida reacción.

La policía no tiene respuesta sobre quién había entrado en el piso, quién me había encerrado y por qué, dado que no se había robado nada. **Probablemente alguien no quiere que los periodistas investiguen qué productos químicos se queman en secreto por la noche en el laboratorio financiado por el Pentágono y por qué un contratista privado en un programa del Pentágono para contrarrestar los narcóticos también trabaja en el mismo laboratorio.** *DilyanaGaytandzhieva es una periodista de investigación búlgara y corresponsal en Oriente Medio. En los últimos dos años ha publicado una serie de informes reveladores sobre el suministro de armas a terroristas en Siria e Irak. Su trabajo actual se centra en programas de armas biológicas.*